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COMMENTS

The foregoing discussion applies only where compensation is
sought,for general disability.28 Whenever the action is for a specific
injury, no credit will be given the employer for wages paid after
the injury. 9
THOMAS

A.

DuRHAm

UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS-OWNERSHIP
AND STATE INHERITANCE TAXES
With a substantial portion of the nation's individual wealth
held in the form of United States Savings Bonds, the questions of
ownership and of ,taxability of these bonds have arisen in numerous
successions.
The treasury department has authorized savings bonds to be
registered in any one of three forms. They may be registered in the
name of a single owner, as "John A. Jones"; or in the name of two
persons as coowners, as "John A. Jones or Mrs. Ella S. Jones"; or
in the name of two persons, one of whom is beneficiary of the other,
as "John A. Jones, payable on death to Mrs. Mary E. Jones."' The
single ownership form presents no problem. When the registered
owner dies, the bonds obviously are a part of his estate and are
subject to inheritance taxes. Virtually all the litigation on the subject has centered around the coownership and the beneficiary forms
of registration.
The matter of actual ownership of the bonds upon the death of
one coowner or of the registered owner seems to have been definitely
settled. In the Succession of Land' the bonds were registered in the
names of the decedent and another as coowners. The court held that
the surviving coowner became absolute owner under the regulations
governing United States War Savings Bonds' subject, however, to
28. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8(1)(A)-(c) as amended [Dart's Stats. (1989)
§ 4398(1)(a)-(c)] provides the schedule of payments for temporary total,
permanent total, and partial disability.
29. Subsection 1(d) of Section 8 of the act [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
4398(1)(d)] provides the schedule of payments for various specific injuries.
In such cases the compensation is more in the nature of damages than disability
payments. See Fulmer v. McDade Gin Co., 142 So. 733 (La. App. 1932); Smith
v. Turner Lumber Co., 174 So. 699 (La. App. 1937).
1. Treasury Department Circular No. 530, Sixth Revision,

10 Fed. Reg.

1956 (1945).
2. 212 La. 103, 31 So. (2d)

609 (1947).

3. Treasury Department Circular
1956 (1945).

No. 530, Sixth Revision, 10 Fed. Reg.
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the rights of the decedent's legal heirs to claim reduction or collation in cash or other property. The Succession of Geagan4 involved
bonds registered in the name of the decedent payable on his death
to his son. After finding that the bonds were purchased with community funds and were therefore community property, the court
held that title to the bonds themselves vested in the named beneficiary but that the surviving widow in community was entitled to a
money judgment against the beneficiary for one-half the value of
the bonds.
The Land and Geagan decisions appear to overrule dictum in
the Succession of Tanner5 which would indicate a contrary result.
In that case, the bonds, purchased with community funds, were
registered in the name of Tanner and his wife as coowners. After
stating that the survivor, Mrs. Tanner, became the sole owner, the
court indicated that she was under no obligation to reimburse the
the community for the funds paid for the bonds.6
Apparently the courts will recognize the rights of the named
coowner or the named beneficiary to ownership of the bonds.7 However, they will not allow savings bonds to be used as a device to
defeat forced heirship or the rights of the surviving spouse in community.8
Whether savings bonds registered in the coownership form or
beneficiary form are subject to state inheritance taxes is not so clearly
established. The question was first presented to a Louisiana appellate court in the Succession of Tanner.' The first circuit court of
appeal held that the surviving coowner of bonds which were issued
in the coownership form owed no inheritance taxes.
4. 33 So. (2d) 118 (La. 1947).
5. 24 So. (2d) 642 (La. App. 1946).
6. 24. So. (2d) 642, 645.
7. Accord: United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 F. Supp. 73
(W. D. Pa. 1943); Warren v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 634. (1929); Conrad
v. Conrad, 152 P. (2d) 221 (Cal. App. 1944); In re Murray's Estate, 236'Iowa
807, 20 N. W. (2d) 49 (1945); Harvey v. Rackliffe, 141 Me. 169, 41 A. (2d)
455 (1945); Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N. J. Eq. II,
29 A. (2d) 854 (1943); In re Fliegelman's Will, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 139 (1945);
In re Deyo's Estate, 180 Misc. 32, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (194,3); In re DiSanto's
Estate, 142 Ohio St. 223, 51 N. E. (2d) 639 (1943).
8. The supreme court said in the Succession of Geagan, 33 So. (2d) 118,
122: "However, we will not permit William J. Geagan, Sr., to do by contract
with the Federal government what he could not have done by donation mortis
causa in this state, that is, dispose of his wife's share of the community property
at his death in favor of a third person ..
9. 24 So. (2d) 642 (La. App. 1946).
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In the Succession of Raborn'° the Louisiana Supreme Court
considered bonds in the beneficiary form. The bonds were registered in the name of the decedent, payable upon his death to his
sister. Relying on the Succession of Tanner, the named beneficiary
sought to have the bonds declared free of state inheritance taxes.
The court held that they were a gift made in contemplation of
death within the meaning of Act 127 of the Extra Session of 1921,"
and subject to inheritance taxes.' 2
The supreme court in the Raborn case stated that its holding
was contrary to that of the Tanner case. It is immediately apparent,
however, that the two cases presented different factual situations.
One involved bonds in which the survivor had an interest from
the date of purchase; the other involved bonds in which the survivor
had no title until after the death of the registered owner. Whether
this factual difference should be of any juridical significance is as
yet somewhat conjectural. Judge Ott, dissenting in the Tanner case,
contended that the provisions for the various forms of registration.
and the limitations thereon were designed solely for the convenience
and protection of the United States Government as payor of the
bonds and that the form should not, therefore, materially affect the
equities arising out of the transaction except insofar as might be
necessary to safeguard the interests and purposes of the United
States Government. It follows from this proposition that although
the named coowner or named beneficiary has the exclusive right
to demand and receive the proceeds of the bonds from the government, he holds such proceeds subject to the state laws governing
ownership and descent of property. In other words, the federal
government, under Treasury Circular 530," will deliver the pro10. 210 La. 1033, 29 So. (2d) 53 (1946).
11. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8556. Section 1 of the act imposes a tax "upon
all inheritances, legacies, and donations and gifts made in contemplation of
death" with certain listed exceptions not here pertinent. In Section 2 of the act
it is declared that "Said tax shall be imposed with respect to all property of
every nature and kind included or embraced in any inheritance, legacy or
donation or gift made in contemplation of death, including all personal property
physically in the state of Louisiana, whether owned or inherited by, or bequeathed,
given or donated to, a resident or nonresident, and whether inherited, bequeathed,
given or donated to, under the law of this state or of any other state or
country, and all personal property owned by residents of the state of Louisiana,
wherever situated, unless such property shall be included in the exemptions
above set forth."
12. Relying on the Succession of Raborn, the Supreme Court of Maine reached
a similar conclusion in the very recent case of Hallett v. Bailey, Inheritance Tax
Commissioner, 54 A. (2d) 533 (Me. 1947), which involved similar facts.
18. Treasury Department Circular No. 530, Sixth Revision, 10 Fed. Reg.
1956 (1945).
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ceeds of the bonds only to the named payee, but the payee must
in turn deliver the proceeds to the estate of the decedent to be
disposed of in accordance with state law.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington, in the case
of Decker v. Fowler,4 took the same position as Judge Ott. After
holding that the treasury directives making the named beneficiary
the sole owner of the bonds was for the convenience of the government inmaking payment, that court said, "It was no concern
of the Federal government to whom the money might belong after
it was paid."' 5 The court ordered the named beneficiary to collect
the proceeds from the government and pay them into the estate
of the deceased.
A contrary conclusion was reached in the New York case In
re Deyo's Estate. 6 In that case the court declared that the treasury
directives on the subject did not relate only to form of payment
and protection of the government from double litigation and held
that they did relate to the actual enjoyment of the proceeds of the
bonds after collection.
Under the rule of the Decker case, the proceeds of the bonds,
regardless of the form of registration, became part of the decedent's
estate and are subject to the state succession laws and inheritance
taxes just as any other asset of the estate; whereas, under the rule
of the Deyo case, it would appear that the bonds would be subject
to state inheritance taxes only if the transaction whereby the beneficiary or surviving coowner acquired his rights fell within the
purview of the inheritance tax laws.
The majority of the court of appeal in the Tanner case adopted
the same rule as did the New York court in the Deyo case. The
Louisiana Supreme Court in the Raborn case did not comment
specifically on the point. It seems, however, to have impliedly
followed the same rule, but it determined that the purchase and
registration of the bonds in the beneficiary form constituted a gift
made in contemplation of death within the terms of the state
inheritance tax statute. The more recent decision, the Succession of
Geagan, 7 is an indication that the supreme court might follow the
14.
15.
16.
17.

199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254 (1939).
199 Wash. 549, 552, 92 P. (2d) 254, 256.
180 Misc. 32, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (1943).
33 So. (2d) 118 (La. 1947).
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Decker case. In the Geagan case the rights of the named beneficiary
were held to be subordinate to the state's community property laws.
It appears that despite the statement of the supreme court in
the Raborn case that its holding was contrary to the Tanner decision, the difference in the factual situations of the two cases may
be significant. The Raborn case is clearly correct as regards bonds
registered in beneficiary form. But bonds registered in the coownership, as in the Tanner case, might not fall into the same category.
While both coowners are still alive, either has the right to present
the bonds for payment without the knowledge or consent of the
other.'8 Clearly the rights of the survivor do not come into being
only upon the death of the other. The legislature has seen fit to
impose an inheritance tax upon "all inheritances, legacies and donations and gifts made in contemplation of death."' "a Savings bonds
registered in the coownership form are perhaps neither inheritance,
legacy, nor donation or gift made in contemplation of death. It
may be, therefore, that they are not within the purview of the
inheritance tax law at all. If this be true, the Succession of Tanner
may still state the correct rule to be applied to cases of bonds issued
in the coownership form.2"
ALFRED M. POSNER
18. Treasury Department Circular No. 530, Sixth Revision, 10 Fed. Reg.
1956 (1945).

19. Supra note 11.
20. Whether or not the purchase and registration of savings bonds in the
coownership form constitutes a donation inter vivos is not within the scope of
this comment.

